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LAW FOR 1950

AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR EXTRA WORK OF SALARIED EMPLOYEE

Oklahoma. In Sanders v. Street's of Tulsa' the plaintiff, a re-

tail merchant, sued to recover the price of certain merchandise
purchased by one of plaintiff's employees. The employee filed a
cross-action for overtime wages, which had allegedly accumulated
for the past few years, failing, however, to allege any express contract to pay. It was held that the employee's cross-action failed.
The reason given was that the employee's cross-action for overtime compensation failed to allege a contract obligating the plaintiff to pay. The court went on to say that it would be presumed
that the salary received by an employee is full compensation for
all services rendered, overtime or otherwise, unless the employee
can show an express or implied agreement to pay for the extra
work. This view, in the absence of wages and hours legislation,
has been subscribed to by most of the jurisdictions in the United
States,2 as well as in Oklahoma.'
Needless to say, no one can force a contract on another by doing
unsolicited services. It is also settled that where one requests another, not a relative, to perform services, the law will presume that
the former intended to pay therefor. But the contrary is true
where one requests another, already employed by the former, to
perform extra work of a type within the scope of the original
employment.4 The courts have learned that in the course of employment a servant many times will be requested to do additional
work with no accompanying intention on the part of the employer
214 P. 2d 910 (1950).
Okla -------------.. ---------

2Sheets v. Eales, 135 Kan. 627, 11 P. 2d 1020 (1932) ; and see cases collected in
Notes, 25 A. L. R. 218 (1923) and 107 A. L. R. 705 (1937).
3 McKelvy v. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co., 52 Okla. 81, 152 Pac. 414 (1915).
4 Robinette v. Hubbard Coal Mining Co., 88 W. Va. 514, 107 S. E. 285 (1921), 25
A. L. R. 212 (1923).
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or employee to pay or be paid therefor. The latter situation is the
usual rather than the unusual one, and the law has developed a
presumption of fact to safeguard the employer. Of course, if an
implied promise be found, a duty to pay results; if none be found,
there is no duty and consequently no cause of action. It should be
noted that the rule is not inflexible and has it limitations. For instance, it has been held that an employee may recover compensation for requested additional work, though there is no express
agreement to pay, where the extra services performed are of a
type outside the original scope of employment,' or where the employee shows other facts from which a promise to pay may be implied." In summation, the principal case can safely be said to fall
within the weight of authority and, at the same time, to strengthen
the Oklahoma position concerning extra compensation for salaried
employees.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO SELL REALTY

Oklahoma. In Edwards v. Storie7 the tenants in common of a
tract of land in Oklahoma executed jointly a power of attorney to
X expressly authorizing him to sell and convey the land and to appoint a subagent for the "care, control, and management" of the
land until sold. After the execution of the power of attorney, A,
one of the owners, died intestate, her undivided interest passing
to her husband and six brothers and sisters. A's husband and three
of her brothers and sisters joined in the power of attorney. The
,evidence showed that X appointed Y to care for the property. Y
wrote X that Z, the plaintiff, was willing to pay $2,000.00 for the
realty. X wrote back telling Y to "close the deal." Y, purportedly
representing the owners, signed a contract of sale with Z. Subsequently, the owners conveyed the property to D; whereupon Z
sued for specific performance of the contract. The supreme court
held that the contract of sale was void and not binding on the
owners of the property.
The court relied on several grounds in declaring the contract
5 Ibid.
$ Kelsey v. Puckett, 198 Iowa 839, 200 N. W. 421 (1924).
213 P. 2d 572 (1950).
7 _.--------..
Okla ..............
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not binding on the principals. At the outset, the court saw that the
power of attorney, on its face, failed to grant any express authority to delegate the power of sale. The question, then, which arose
was whether X was impliedly authorized to delegate the power of
sale. The court attacked the problem through two distinct theories.
First, the power of attorney expressly authorized X to appoint a
subagent for the care, control, and management of the land. The
court said that where the express power to appoint a subagent for
specified purposes is given, this authority necessarily excludes
implied power to appoint a subagent for any other purpose. This
rule is but another way of saying that the specific authorization
of particular acts tends to show that a more general authority is
not intended. Particularly is this true as regards a power of attorney, the courts agreeing that powers of attorney are to be construed
strictly. Certainly, the subagent, Y, had all those implied powers
ordinarily necessary to effectuate the main authority granted to
him. But the power to sell or contract to sell the land itself can
hardly be advanced as a power ordinarily necessary to effectuate
the care, control, and management of land.
Secondly, the court held that where an agent has been entrusted
with a task involving discretion and trust, the agent may not delegate such task to another. His authority is said to be personal and
cannot be delegated unless this power is expressly set out in the
power of attorney, or necessarily implied therefrom. Thus, by its
decision the court placed the authority to sell realty among the
powers which create a personal trust. The court followed the wellsettled law in the United States, 8 the general feeling being that
the personal confidence present in such relations is abundant rea.
son that the trust should not be delegated to another without the
principal's consent, the latter having no knowledge of the qualifications of the subagent.
On the other hand, it seems that an agent clothed with general
authority, in contrast with a special agent to sell a particular piece
of land, has an implied power of delegation when the necessity
8 Brouse v. Cox, 129 Okla. 130, 263 Pac. 1090 (1923) ; see cases collected in 2 Am,
Jun. Agency, § 196, p. 154.
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of such delegation is apparent from the nature of the business.9
It must also be kept in mind that where, in the execution of an
authority, a purely ministerial act is to be performed, it may be
delegated to a subagent because the reason supporting the nodelegation rule has disappeared."i Under the facts in the principal
case, it might seem plausible to argue that the power of sale was
never delegated to Y-i.e., that X exercised, rather than delegated,
his discretionary duties. But there was no determination between
X and Y as to the terms of the sale. X authorized Y to "close
the deal." To accomplish this, Y had to draw up a contract of sale
and set out, at his discretion, the terms of payment. Drawing up
a contract cannot be said to be a ministerial act. Rather, it is an
incident of the authority to sell and convey realty which, possessing a personal nature, cannot be delegated. In all probability, the
attorney in fact could have properly delegated the signing of a
contract previously agreed upon, but could not do more than that.
To buttress its opinion further, the court declared the contract
of sale void under the Oklahoma Statute of Frauds, which requires
the authority of an agent, signing a land contract, to be in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged. Ix In the principal case
there was no such writing signed by the party to be charged-the
owners. The power of attorney was construed not to give the subagent any authority to contract to sell the land, and the letter to
the subagent was not signed by the appropriate party. It is interesting to note that in Texas, Arkansas, New York, and several other
states parol authorization of an agent to make a binding land
contract is proper and effective.12
Even if the contract of sale had been valid, it would have failed
to pass all the interest in the land, three of A's heirs having failed
to join in the power of attorney. In conclusion, the court noted
that the payment of the $100.00 earnest money to Y, an agent
without authority to receive it, by Z, was not payment to the prin9 See Williams v. Leforce, 177 Okla. 638, 61 P. 2d 714, 718 (1936).
10 L. B. Grant Lumber Co. v. Robertson, 84 Okla. 277, 203 Pac. 478 (1921).
11 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 136-5.
12 Armstrong v. Palmer, 218 S. W. 627 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) er. ref.; see cases collected in Note, 27 A. L. R. 606 (1923).
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cipal when the money failed to come into the hands of the principal, or an agent authorized to receive it.
DUTY TO WARN SERVANT AND THE DOCTRINE OF

ASSUMPTION OF SKILL
13
Oklahoma. In Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Price
the administrator of the estate of the deceased; X, sued defendant oil company
for damages, contending the defendant's failure to warn X of the
hazards incident to his employment was a breach of duty and the
proximate cause of his death. The evidence showed that X was
employed to work on defendant's pipeline. Previous to X's employment, several employees had suffered facial and skin burns
as a result of exposure to the poisonous fumes emitted from the
hot coal tar enamel which was used to coat the pipe. The defendant
knew of this but did not seem to know of the injurious effect of
breathing the fumes. X's employment required him to work in and
around the fumes. Upon X's employment defendant failed to warn
him of the dangerous propensities of the tar fumes. Upon these
facts a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, the supreme court holding that the employer
oil company in operating the pipeline, in coating the pipes with
hot enamel, and in sending X without warning into the fumes was
bound to know the dangerous constituents and effects of the fumes,
and, in the exercise of ordinary care, was bound to warn X of
the danger.
The court went on to quote from the case of Mid-Continent Oil
Co. v. Jamison14 to the effect that the master is charged with a
knowledge of scientific facts which an uneducated man is presumed not to know. This doctrine has been called "assumption of
skill." As a result of its application, defendant was charged with
the knowledge that the fumes were injurious to the lungs. At first
glance, the expression "bound to know," though commonly used,
might lead one to believe that knowledge of the injurious effects
of the fumes was strictly imputed to the employer without regard
13

...........
Okla ---.-

, 225 P. 2d 176 (1950).

14 197 Okla. 387, 171 P. 2d 976 (1946).
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to negligence. However, a careful reading of the opinion discloses
that the question of whether or not the employer should have
known of the danger was submitted to the jury. If the employer
should have known of the danger, he is treated as if he did know,
ignorance induced by negligence being the equivalent of knowledge. This imputed knowledge is commonly referred to as constructive knowledge. Knowledge, actual or constructive, together
with the master-servant relationship, forms the basis for an employer's duty to warn his employees of hazards incident to the
employment which cannot be discovered by ordinary care. One
who is employed by another and is directed to perform certain
work has good reason to believe his employer will disclose all nonobvious risks of which he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary
care should know, since the employer is in a relatively better position to know of such dangers. This is particularly true where the
employee is inexperienced. It follows that an employer is under
a duty to warn his employees of the non-obvious risks of which
he knows, or in the exercise of due care should know.' 5 For failure
to perform this duty the employer is liable in accordance with the
accepted principles of the law of negligence.
With these general principles in mind, it is readily seen that the
doctrine announced in the principal case follows the weight of
authority in the United States. "Assumption of skill" is merely a
facet of the standard of care accepted generally-the reasonably
prudent man. The doctrine in effect requires of one who has undertaken a business enterprise to have that amount of skill and
knowledge ordinarily found in persons who undertake such matters. Thus, it is seen that "assumption of skill" is but a name
coined to indicate certain circumstances which shape the responsibility of the reasonably prudent employer. It seems that Pollock
originated the expression 6 and that it was first adopted in an early
Georgia case.' 7 Since that time, the terminology has been limited
to Oklahoma and several of the southeastern states.
William C. Charlton.
"Britt v. Doty, 195 Okla. 620, 161 P. 2d 521 (1945).
16 POLLOCK, TORTS (14th ed. 1939) 21, 22.
17 Breard v. Georgian Mfg. Co., 70 S. E. 57 (Ga. App. 1911).

